When is a peace deal not a peace deal? When the fighting continues; might be one answer.
That is the case in eastern DR Congo, where fighting between the M23 militia group, supported by the Rwandan army, and Congolese forces has not stopped despite Congo’s president Felix Tshisekedi and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame signing the ‘second phase’ of a multi-layered peace agreement in the White House with US president Donald Trump last week.
“Although this peace was agreed or declared, actually, there is no peace,” said the EU’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas at a hearing with the European Parliament’s foreign affairs committee earlier this week.
Getting to announce a peace deal is one thing, said Kallas, but ending atrocities and hate speech is a long way away.
The EU’s role could be in helping to deliver “long-term sustainable peace,” she said.
Congolese diplomats, led by foreign minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, say that Rwanda/M23 have repeatedly flouted the June ceasefire agreement that was the ‘first phase’ of the peace talks which culminated in the White House event.
In fact, M23 has tightened its grip in the Kivu region, according to observers in the Kivu area. “When we look on the ground, no more than two weeks after this agreement was signed, the M23 went on a killing spree,” Wagner told EUobserver.
In August, the UN high commissioner on human rights, reported that M23 killed at least 319 civilians in a series of attacks on four villages in North Kivu province in July.
Such is the militia group’s control – with the support of the Kagame government – that local reporters in East Africa have been required to have their applications for visas to cover the conflict processed by the M23.
The November peace agreement includes eight implementation protocols, covering ceasefire monitoring, prisoner exchange, and a timeline, as well as details on how humanitarian aid will be allowed to reach communities in the Kivus, and the return of refugees.
But it does not feature plans on the disarmament of M23 and Rwanda’s nearly 12,000 troop deployment in eastern DR Congo.
Rwanda, meanwhile, has demanded action against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, the Hutu militia group that includes genocidaires from the 1994 atrocities in Rwanda.
Yet both sides appear to have accepted that the facade of peace is the price to free up American spending.
The peace talks were mediated by the United States and Qatar, with Massad Boulos, president Trump’s personal envoy, and father-in-law to his daughter Tiffany, the main broker.
The US administration has made the peace process a precondition for the US to invest in DR Congo and Rwanda, particularly in their critical minerals sector.
Trump has made increased access to and supply of critical minerals and rare earths a key priority.
Indeed, this mirrors the US rare earths deal with Ukraine, one of many preconditions that the Trump administration has put on continuing its support for Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
In the days leading up to the signing ceremony, the Congolese army’s spokesperson, major general Sylvain Ekenge, said its troops had come under attack from the M23 group.
Similar accusations were made against Congo by M23’s allies, while last week Kagame claimed that Kinshasa was trying to unpick the agreement.
Rwanda and Kenya, whose own president William Ruto was also at the US ceremony acting as a ‘guarantor’, have since signed deals with the US that will unlock over $220m [€187.8m] in health funding.
These are the first of a series of bilateral ‘America First’ health agreements that will replace USAID, but only with governments that the Trump administration feels it can do business with.
These health agreements will bypass NGOs, civil society groups and other third parties, with the money going directly to African treasuries.
The money will prioritise treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS and TB, as well as malaria, maternal care, polio eradication, and infectious disease outbreak response and preparedness.
Like the minerals and investment agreements, these health pacts are far more nakedly transactional than development aid and come with few strings attached, particularly in comparison to the EU.
But, meanwhile, what is next for the EU?
Congolese ministers, led by Wagner, have been deeply frustrated by the EU’s refusal to suspend its ‘cash for minerals access’ deal with Rwanda – despite plenty of evidence that minerals have been smuggled from Congo into Rwanda and then sold on.
In an interview with EUobserver in October, Wagner urged the EU to impose sanctions on individuals at the top of the Rwandan army and government.
On Tuesday (9 December), Kallas did not rule out the prospect of fresh EU sanctions on Rwandan officials, having previously sanctioned a government minister and several top army officers.
"We have restrictive measures against individuals and entities fuelling and taking advantage of the conflict,” she said, “but it's clear that this is still ongoing, so we need to do more.”
However, the way that the US has brokered the peace, however phoney, has outflanked Brussels and may diminish its already waning influence in the region.
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Benjamin Fox is a seasoned reporter and editor, previously working for fellow Brussels publication Euractiv. His reporting has also been published in the Guardian, the East African, Euractiv, Private Eye and Africa Confidential, among others. He heads up the AU-EU section at EUobserver, based in Nairobi, Kenya.
Benjamin Fox is a seasoned reporter and editor, previously working for fellow Brussels publication Euractiv. His reporting has also been published in the Guardian, the East African, Euractiv, Private Eye and Africa Confidential, among others. He heads up the AU-EU section at EUobserver, based in Nairobi, Kenya.